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Abstract. The formal study of computer malware was initiated in the
seminal work of Fred Cohen in the mid 80s who applied elements of
the Theory of Computation in the investigation of the theoretical limits
of using the Turing Machine formal model of computation in detecting
viruses. Cohen gave a simple but realistic, formal, definition of the char-
acteristic actions of a computer virus as a Turing Machine that replicates
itself and then proved that constructing a Turing Machine that recog-
nizes viruses (i.e. Turing Machines that act like viruses) is impossible,
by reducing the Halting Problem, which is undecidable, to the problem
of recognizing a computer virus. In this paper we complement Cohen’s
approach along similar lines, based on Recursion Function Theory and
the Theory of Computation. More specifically, after providing a simple
generalization of Cohen’s definition of a computer virus, we show that
the malware/non-malware classification problem is undecidable under
this new definition. Moreover, we show that to any formal system, there
correspond infinitely many, effectively constructible, programs for which
no proof can be produced by the formal system that they are either mal-
ware or non-malware programs. In other words, given any formal system,
one can provide a procedure that generates, systematically, an infinite
number of impossible to classify, within the formal system, programs.
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the problem of classifying programs either
as malware or non-malware based on formal proof systems and their de-
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ductive procedures. Our goal is to study the deductive power of formal
systems with respect to the problem of producing proofs that can char-
acterize all computer programs either as malware or non-malware. Our
work is based on the foundations of computability and recursive function
theory which, essentially, study problems with respect to their theoretical
solvability based on the universal Turing Machine model of a mechanical
and effective computation.
Formal proofs about the impossibility of detecting, in a systematic
(i.e. algorithmic) and general way, malicious entities, such as Malware
in our case, already exist for a long time for a very important category
of such entities, the computer viruses or malware in general. A virus is
a malicious program, a Turing Machine formally, that operates with an
aim to replicate in other programs (Turing Machines), thus spreading the
infection. The formal study of computer programs which act as viruses
and their algorithmic detection was initiated in the seminal work of Fred
Cohen in the mid 80s (see [1, 2]). Cohen starts with a simple, formal, def-
inition of the characteristic actions of a virus. Then, he proceeds to prove
that constructing a Turing Machine that recognizes viruses (technically,
other Turing Machines that act like viruses) is impossible.
More specifically, Cohen defined a virus to be a program, or Tur-
ing Machine, that simply copies itself to other programs, or more for-
mally, injects its transition function into other Turing Machines’ tran-
sition functions (see Definition 1 in Section 2) replicating, thus, itself
indefinitely. Then, he proves that the problem of deciding whether a
given Turing Machine halts on a given input, i.e. deciding the language
Lu, can be reduced to the problem of deciding whether a given Turing
Machine is a virus, i.e. Lu = {< M,w > |w ∈ L(M)} is reduced to
Lv = {< M > |M is a virus }. Since Lu is undecidable, so must be Lv
and, thus, it is in principle impossible to detect a virus or else we could
decide Lu which is, provably, undecidable.
Following Cohen’s paradigm, we will propose a rather restricted (so
as to be amenable to a theoretical analysis) but reasonable and precise
definition of malware. To this end, we also deploy the Turing Machine the-
oretical model of an effective computational procedure to model malware
programs. Thus, a malware is a program, i.e. a Turing Machine, that exe-
cutes, at some point of its operation, at least one action from a specific set
of actions that characterize malware behaviour (these actions are called
states in the Turing Machine definition). We remark that simply locating
the actions in a program through, e.g. syntactic analysis, is not consid-
ered to manifest malware behaviour, in the proposed model, only their
actual execution is considered to manifest such a behaviour. Admittedly
this is a, rather, restricted malware model since malicious behaviour can
be complex, e.g. in DoS (Denial of Service) attacks or may include sev-
eral, combined, steps or Turing Machine states (e.g. Ransomware, which
executes sequences of malicious actions to encrypt files on a victim com-
puter). However, we chose this simpler model in order to be able to benefit
from the rich and deep results of the Theory of Computation and, thus,
provide some first results based on an established and mature compu-
tational model and scientific discipline. Consequently, our goal is to use
this, rather restricted but theoretically manageable and plausible, mal-
ware model in order to obtain a malware undecidability result similar
to Cohen’s, i.e. there is no algorithm (Turing Machine) that can detect,
systematically, all malware programs that fall under this definition.
The theoretical undecidability of the malware/non-malware classifi-
cation problem means that, in general, no algorithm exists that can take
as input a program and decide whether it is a malware or not. Our next
step, in this paper, is to investigate whether it is possible to effectively
demonstrate one of the programs which are not amenable to classifica-
tion. In other word, our goal is to see whether it is possible to construct a
specific Turing Machine whose classification status as either malware or
non-malware cannot be decided. In the context of malware, such a Tur-
ing Machine would provide evidence of, potentially, hard or impossible to
detect malware. To investigate this possibility, we turn to formal systems
and, in particular, formal systems powerful enough to enable statements
about Turing Machines, such as statements that state whether they halt,
given a particular input, or not. We show that to each consistent for-
mal system, there corresponds an infinite, recursively enumerable set of
Turing Machines for which there exists no proof, in the formal system,
that they are malware and there exists no proof, in the same formal sys-
tem, that they are not malware. This is a humble example of a nature
similar to Gödel’s famous, groundstaking, result about the incomplete-
ness of consistent formal systems in the sense that for each such system,
there exist statements, of a self-referential nature, that neither themselves
nor their negations can be proved within the formal system. In addition,
these self-referential statements are, indeed, true (but not provable), if
and only if the formal system is consistent (see, e.g., [9] for an accessi-
ble coverage of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems and their consequences
for formal systems). Inspired by this important consequence of the incom-
pleteness result, we show that the infinitely many Turing Machines whose
malware/non-malware status is impossible to prove within a consistent
formal system, are actually non-malware but it is impossible to prove it
within the formal system by the, purely. formal procedures allowed within
the formal system. In other words, we show that these Turing Machines
are non-malware if and only if the formal system used to classify them as
malware or non-malware is consistent.
Before we proceed, we should remark that theoretical impossibility
does not imply impossibility in practice since Turing Machines are ideal-
istic models of computers with unlimited computational resources. How-
ever, the finite nature of real computers and programs renders all unde-
cidable problems decidable by simple (but highly inefficient in practice)
brute force approaches. Thus, theoretical impossibility results may not
translate, readily, into impossibility results in practice.
2 Foundations of Computation Theory
We will assume a basic level of familiarity with the fundamental concepts
and results of Recursive Function Theory. However, for completeness, we
will briefly review Turing Machines and the basic results of the Theory
of Computation and Recursive Function theory. In doing so, we extend
in a straightforward way the standard Turing Machine model in order to
model malware activity. With respect to the presentation, we follow the
exposition in the excellent, classic, book on the subject by Hoprcoft and
Ullmann [5]. Before providing the details, we note that there are other,
more practical, computational models that could be employed but since
the theory we deploy concerns the classical Turing Machine model, we
decided to base our results on this model for simplicity. We feel, however,
that the results can be extended, with some effort, to other computational
models which are more realistic.
Definition 1 (Turing Machine). A Turing Machine is an octuple, de-
fined as M=(Q,QMal,Σ ,Γ , δ, q0, B, F ), where Q is a finite set of states,
Γ is a finite set called the tape alphabet, where Γ contains a special sym-
bol B that represents a blank, Σ is a subset of Γ−{B} called the input
alphabet, δ is a partial function from Q×Γ to Q×Γ×{L,R} called the
transition function, q0∈Q is a distinguished state called the start state,
F ⊂ Q, q0 6∈ F , is a set of final states, and QMal ⊂ Q, QMal ∩ F = ∅, is a
distinguished set of states linked to Malware behaviour. We assume that
transitions from states in QMal do not change the Turing Machine’s tape
contents, i.e. they are purely interactions with the external environment
of the Turing Machine and can affect only the environment.
We should remark that there are three basic assumptions in the definition
of a Turing Machine:
1. The tape can be extended on a need basis, i.e. each time the machine
needs more cells (memory) on the tape, which is assumed to be auto-
matically extended. In this respect, the memory of a Turing Machine
is, virtually, unlimited.
2. Computational steps, i.e. reading of a tape cell, change of state and
advance of the tape head, are executed instantaneously.
3. There are no operation errors during the operation of the machine.
Thus, the Turing Machine is an idealized formal model of a real computer
that abstracts away from construction, technology, and speed details not
relevant to the fundamentals of mechanical or algorithmic computation
in order to allow us to explore the theoretical limits of machines in solving
problems.
A Turing Machine can be viewed either as a language acceptor or a
function calculator. The language accepted by a Turing Machine M , de-
noted by L(M), is the set of strings in Σ∗ that when given as input to M ,
lead it to an acceptance state, i.e. a state in set F . In recursive function
theory, these languages are also called recursively enumerable. In general,
without loss of generality, we can assume that the Turing Machine, when
it accepts an input string, it also halts i.e. there are no next steps af-
ter an accepting state. In this paper, we will not use Turing Machines
that compute functions. However, we should remark, that there is no loss
of generality by confining ourselves to Turing Machines as language ac-
ceptors (see, for instance, the discussion in [5]). Thus, for our purposes,
Turing Machines operate as language acceptors (see below).
In Figure 1 we see the structure of a Turing Machine, according to
Definition 1, and in Table 1 we see a sample Turing Machine computation.
q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6
0 (q1,#,∆) (q1,0,∆) (q3,1,A) (q3,0,A) (q4,0,A) (q5,#,∆) -
(stops)




(q4,#,A) (q0,#,∆) (q6,0,∆) (q6,#,∆) -
(stops)
Table 1. Operation of a TM
Fig. 1. The Turing Machine computation model
Thus, a Turing Machine is, essentially, a theoretical model of a real
computer that allows us to study the power of mechanical, or algorith-
mic, computation and its limits. As a consequence, we can also deepen
our understanding about which problems can be solved in principle by
mechanical computations.
With respect to the evolution and termination of the computation of
a Turing Machine, we have the following three possibilities:
1. The machine halts in a final state. Then the input string is accepted
(i.e. it belongs to the language accepted by the Turing Machine).
There is no loss of generality in assuming that the Turing Machine
halts (i.e. it has no next move) whenever the input is accepted.
2. The machine halts in a non-final state. Then the input is rejected (i.e.
it does not belong to the language accepted by the Turing Machine).
3. The machine does not halt at all, i.e. it runs for ever (it has entered
an “infinite loop”, as computer engineers say). Then certainly the
input string is never accepted, i.e. it does not belong to the language
accepted by the Turing Machine, but there is no way (as we will see
below) to decide that the computation will not ever terminate (it is
the famous, undecidable, Halting problem).
With respect to notation, for a given Turing Machine M we denote by
< M > its code, i.e. an encoding of its description elements as stated in
Definition 1 using any fixed alphabet, usually the alphabet {0, 1} (binary
system) which since the inception of computing machines was the alpha-
bet of choice due to its simplicity and efficiency in representing it with
electronic states (two such states suffice). The details of such an encoding
can be found in, e.g., [5] but it is really much like the representation of a
program in machine code or assembly, which are the native programming
languages executed by processing units in modern computers.
One of the major results of Turing’s seminal work on computability
was the existence of a universal Turing Machine, that is a Turing Machine
that takes as input strings which represent other Turing Machines and
their inputs and simulates (executes) them producing their results on
their behalf. This is actually what a modern computer does, taking as an
input program descriptions along with their inputs and producing their
outputs by executing them (see, e.g., [5] for the encoding details).
The main outcome of Turing’s pioneering work was, the formaliza-
tion of what a mechanical procedure is using the Turing Machine model.
This work gave rise to the computability theory, that classifies problems
according to whether they can be solved, in principle, by mechanical pro-
cedures or Turing Machines. One of the major results of Alan Turing was
the proof that there exist problems that Turing Machines cannot solve.
For instance, the first problem (theoretically, there are infinitely many
such problems) what was shown to be unsolvable by Turing Machines
(i.e. algorithms) is the, so called, Halting problem:
The Halting Problem
Input: A string x =< M,w > which is actually the encoding (descrip-
tion) of a Turing Machine <M> and its input w.
Output: If the input Turing Machine M halts on w, the output is True.
Otherwise, the output is False.
The language corresponding to the Halting problem is Lu = {<
M,w > |w ∈ L(M)}. In other words, the language Lu contains all possible
Turing Machine-input pair encodings < M,w > such that w is accepted
by M . This is why Lu is also called universal language since the problem
of deciding whether a given Turing Machine M accepts a given input w is
equivalent to deciding whether < M,w >∈ Lu. Note that Lu is accepted
by a Turing Machine, the universal one denoted by Mu, that simulates
M on w. If w ∈ L(M), then the universal Turing Machine will accept
the pair < M,w >. However, if the opposite holds true, then we only
know that Mu will not terminate in a final state. What we do not know,
however, is whether Mu will ever stop (in a non-final state of course).
Languages for which Turing Machines exist that accept them and always
halt are called recursive or decidable.
The language Lu was the first language proved to be non-recursive
or undecidable by Turing, meaning that it is impossible to decide algo-
rithmically whether a given program halts or not on a given input. The
proof relies on a clever Cantor diagonalisation, self-reference based, argu-
ment over all possible Turing Machines. Such arguments lie in the heart
of mathematical logic as well as theoretical computer science for proving
impossibility or non-existence arguments.
3 Recursive Function Theory
We should stress the fact that Computation and Recursive Function The-
ory are computation model independent. The model of computation can
be any reasonable model such as the Turing Machine (see Section 2),
the λ-terms (in the λ-Calculus), µ-recursive functions as well as, in a
more practical perspective, any real computer programming language. It
is not hard to prove that the theoretical computational power of all these
computation models is the same, if we disregard efficiency issues.
In addition, the computational procedures or programs that can be
written in any computation formalism or real programming language can
be enumerated effectively (see, e.g., [5]). This means that there exists
an algorithm which can list all the programs in a sequence, so that all
programs appear at some point of the enumeration procedure.
A well known result from computability theory states that the number
of arguments in a function (program) is not important, for computability
theory, since arguments can, always, be embedded, in an easy way, in the
program itself, reducing, in this way, the number of arguments. This is
formalized in the following result, which is a simplified form of Kleene’s
Smn-theorem (see [6]), for functions of two arguments.
Theorem 1 (Kleene’s Smn-theorem - simplified form, for two-
input functions). Let g(x, y) be a partial recursive function. Then, there
is a total recursive function σ of one variable, such that fσ(x)(y) = g(x, y)
for all x and y. That is, if σ(x) is considered as the integer (code) repre-




In addition, we will need another result from recursive function theory,
namely the Recursion Theorem which states that every total recursive
function that maps Turing Machine indices on Turing Machine indices
has a fixed point. We state, formally, this theorem below as Theorem 2.
In what follows, we fix a formal system F , e.g. such as Peano’s Arith-
metic, which can, directly, express statements about natural numbers.
Our departure point is the, already, known fact that, given such a formal
system, which we will denote by F , we can, effectively, construct a Turing
Machine M with the following property: there is no proof in F that M ,
when started on a specific input, halts and there is no proof that M , when
started on a specific input, does not halt. The proof can be found in [5],
Chapter 8. We will denote by MF such a Turing Machine (there may be
several with this property) whose halting status in unprovable in F .
Naturally, the details of MF depend on F but the important issue, in
our context, is that MF can be constructed effectively, i.e. algorithmically,
but, not necessarily, efficiently i.e. fast. In what follows we will present the
proof of this fact since some of its elements are crucial in the presentation
of our ideas. We, first, state the Recursion Theorem along with its proof
(based on [5]) since it is crucial for our arguments that follow in Section 4.
Theorem 2. For any total recursive function σ there exists an x0 such
that fx0(x) = fσ(x0)(x), for all x.
Proof. For each integer i, we construct a Turing Machine that when given
input x it computes fi(i). Then, it simulates the fi(i)th Turing Machine
on x. Let g(i) be the index of the constructed Turing Machine. By defi-
nition
fg(i)(x) = ffi(i)(x) (1)
for all x. Note that g(i) is a total function, i.e. defined everywhere (and,
thus, the TM that computes it always halts) even if fi(i) is not defined,
i.e. fi does not halt with input i. Let j be an index of the function σg, i.e.
j is the index (encoding) of a TM that, when given i as input, computes
g(i) and then applies the function σ on g(i). Thus, for x0 = g(j) the
following is derived, after some manipulations:
fx0(x) = fσ(x0)(x) (2)
for all x. Therefore, x0 is a fixed point of the mapping σ, i.e the TMs x0
and σ(x0) compute the same function. 
Based on the Recursion Theorem, the following, central to our approach
in Section 4, is proved in [5]:
Theorem 3. Given a formal system F , we can construct a Turing Ma-
chine for which no proof exists in F that it either halts or does not halt.
Proof. Given F , we construct a Turing Machine M that computes a func-
tion, g(i, j), of two inputs as follows:
g(i, j) =

1, if there is a proof in F thatfi(j) is not defined
(i.e. does not halt) or, in other words if there is
a proof that the ith Turing Machine does not
halt, given input j
undefined, otherwise
(3)
The Turing Machine M works by enumerating proofs in F . When a proof
is found that states that the ith Turing Machine does not halt when given
input j. Moreover, M can be designed so that if g(i, j) = 1 then it halts,
otherwise it does not halt.
From the Smn-theorem (see Theorem 1), there exists a total function
σ on Turing Machine indices (i.e. codes) such that
fσ(i)(j) = g(i, j). (4)
From Recursion Theorem, we can construct an integer i0 such that
fi0(j) = fσ(i0)(j) = g(i0, j). (5)
However, g(i0, j) = 1 and it is, thus, defined if and only if there exists a
proof in F that states that fi0(j) is not defined. Therefore, if F is con-
sistent, i.e. there can be no proofs of, both, a statement and its negation,
then no proof can exist in F that the i0-th Turing Machine either halts
or does not halt when given a specific input j. 
The corollary that follows below is not stated in [5] but it is not hard to
prove, as a consequence of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. For the i0-th Turing maching, denoted by Mi0, constructed
in the proof of Theorem 3 and computing the function fi0(j), it holds that
it does not halt for every input j if and only if F is consistent.
Proof. Let assume that F is consistent and that Mi0 halts for some input
j0. Then, since F is consistent, there can be no proof in F that Mi0 does
not halt, for any input j. According, then, to the definition of g(i, j) in
Equation 3, Theorem 3, g(i0, j0) is undefined. But since (see Theorem 3)
fi0(j0) = g(i0, j0), we arrive at a contradiction since the left-hand side is
defined and the right-hand side is undefined.
Let us assume, now, that Mi0 does not halt, for every input j. It
follows, since fi0(j) = g(i0, j), that g(i0, j) is undefined for every j. Thus,
there is no proof in F that Mi0 does not halt on input j, for any j.
Accordingly, F must be consistent since, otherwise, it can produce a proof,
in F , that Mi0 does not halt on input j, as everything follows from an
inconsistent formal system, leading to a contradiction, since g(i0, j) is
undefined for all j. 
4 Theoretical impossibility of a complete formal
malware/non-malware program classification
In this section we give a simple formal definition of malware following
and extending Cohen’s ideas.
Definition 2. (Formal Malware definition) A Malware is a Turing Ma-
chine that when executed will demonstrate a specific, recognizable, behav-
ior particular to malware, as manifested by the execution (not simply
the existence in the Turing Machine’s description) of a specific sequence
of actions, e.g. it will publish secret information about an entity, it will
download information illegally etc., actions reflected by reaching, during
its operation, states in the set QMal (see Definition 1).
This is similar to Cohen’s definition of a virus since it characterizes Mal-
ware programs according to their visible or manifested behavior. We stress
the word “execution” in order to preclude situations where a false alarm is
raised for a “Malware” program which, merely, contains the states in QMal
without ever invoking them. Such programs, actually, operate normally
without ever executing any actions characteristic to malware behavior.
The Malware Detection Problem
Input: A description of a Turing Machine (program).
Output: If the input Turing Machine behaves like Malware according to
Definition 2 output True. Otherwise, output False.
More formally, if Lb denotes the language consisting of Turing Machine
encodings < M > which are Malware, according to Definition 2, then we
want to decide Lb, i.e. to design a Turing Machine that, given < M >,
decides whether < M > belongs in Lb or not according to this definition.
Let QMal be the set of actions which, when executed, manifest Malware
behavior (see Definition 2). We will show that Lu is recursive in Lb. This
implies that if we had a decision procedure for Lb then this procedure
could also be used for deciding Lu which is undecidable. Thus, no decision
procedure exists for Lb too.
In [7] the following was proved in a similar context:
Theorem 4 (Theoretical impossibility of detecting Malware). The
language Lb is undecidable.
Proof. Our proof is similar to Cohen’s proof about the impossibility of
detecting viruses. Note that Rice’s Theorem (see, e.g., [5]) is not appli-
cable here since the Malware Detection Problem we consider does not
involve properties of the languages accepted by Turing Machines but,
rather, properties of their operation (i.e. reachability of a subset of their
states, the malware bahaviour related states). In [7] we consider a de-
tection problem for Turing Machines modeling Panopticons that involves
properties of the accepted languages not their operation specifics.
Let < M,w >, with M=(Q,QMal,Σ ,Γ , δ, q0, B, F ) and QMal ⊂ Q the
Malware states (see Definition 1), be an instance of the Halting problem.
We will show how we can decide whether < M,w > belongs in Lu or not
using a hypothetical decision procedure for Lb, i.e. Lu is recursive in Lb.
Given < M,w > we design a Turing Machine Mu−b that modifies the
δ function of M so as when a final state is reached (i.e. a state in the set
F of M) a transition takes place into a state in QMal (any state suits our
purpose). That is, M is a new Turing Machine M ′ containing the actions
of M followed by actions (any of them) described by the states in QMal.
Now, M ′ is given as input the input w of M operating as described above.
Let us assume that there exists a Turing Machine Mb that decides Lb.
Then we can give it M ′ as input. Suppose that Mb answers that M
′ ∈ Lb.
Since QMal was finally reached, this implies that M halted on w since M
′
initially simulated M on w. Then we are certain that M halts on w.
Assume, now, that Mb decides that M
′ is not Malware. Then a state
in QMal was never entered, which implies that no halting state is reached
by M on w since QMal in M
′ is reached only from halting states of M ,
which is simulated by M ′. Thus, M does not halt on w.
It, thus, appears that M ′ is Malware if and only if M halts on w
and, thus, we have shown that Lu is recursive in Lb. There is a catch,
however, that invalidates this reasoning: if M itself can exhibit the QMal
linked Malware behavior in the first place. Then Malware behavior can be
manifested, if states in QMal are ever executed, without ever M reaching a
final state that would trigger M ′ to enter a state in QMal, by construction.
A solution to this issue is to remove QMal from M , giving this new
version to Mu−b to produce M ′. Thus, we now have the equivalence M ′ is
Malware if and only if M halts on w, completing the proof (see, also, [1]).
More formally, let QMal = {qMal1 , qMal2 , . . . , qMall}, l = |QMal| be the
set of Malware states. We create a new set of “harmless” or “no opera-
tion” states P ′ = {q′1, q′2, . . . , q′l} where qMali corresponds to q′i and vice
versa. Then, we replace the states in QMal by the corresponding states in
P ′ everywhere in the definition elements of M and we also do the corre-
sponding state changes in the δ function that defines the Turing Machine’s
state transitions. This transformation removes from a potential Malware
the actions that if executed would manifest Malware behavior. We stress,
again, the fact the mere existence of Malware actions in the definition of
a Turing Machine is not considered Malware action if they are not acti-
vated at some point of its operation. With this last transformation, M ′ is
a Malware if and only if M halts on w and, thus, Lu is recursive in Lb. 
We now turn to, actually, constructing a particular Turing Machine,
which cannot be classified as malware or non-malware, by purely formal
procedures, within any consistent formal system F .
Theorem 5 (Malware/non-malware classification resistant pro-
grams). Let F be a consistent formal system. Then we can construct
a Turing Machine for which there is no proof in F that it behaves as
malware and no proof that it does not behave as malware.
Proof. Let MF be a Turing Machine whose halting status on any given
input j cannot be proven in F in either direction, i.e. “halts” or “does
not halt”. Such a Turing Machine exists by Theorem 3. This is a Turing
Machine like Mi0 which was constructed in Theorem 3. A new Turing
Machine, MMF =(Q,QMal,Σ ,Γ , δ, q0, B, F ), of one input and QMal ⊂ Q,
the malware states, is constructed. It is composed of three parts. The first
part is a non-malware Turing Machine, denoted by Mn the second part
is MF , and the third part is a malware Turing Machine, denoted by Mw.
The construction details of these Turing Machines are not hard but
they are tedious, thus we will provide a rather high level description. The
construction of MF , given F , has already been described in Section 2.
With respect to Mn, it can be any Turing Machine that, simply, does
not use any states in QMal, e.g. a Turing Machine that computes a simple
arithmetic function (see, for instance, Table 1 in Section 2). Finally, Mw
executes, during its operation, at least one state in QMal. It is not hard
to construct such a Turing Machine, e.g. it can be a Turing Machine that
simply, after leaving the start state, executes one more step involving a
state in QMal before halting (i.e. reaching a final state).
With respect to its operation, MMF , first, activates the first part, i.e.
Mn, which may ignore the input, say j, and operates with its non-Malware
behavior, i.e. it never visits states in QMal during its operation. Then MF
is activated with input j. By construction, MF does not use states in
QMal. Finally, the third part, i.e. Mw, starts operating, exhibiting Malware
behaviour by visiting at least one state in QMal during its operation.
Suppose, now, that a proof exists in F that MMF is a malware, i.e. it
exhibits malware behaviour when activated by reaching states in QMal. By
the construction ofMMF , the only way to demonstrate malware behaviour
is to activate its third part, i.e. Mw. This, in turn, can occur only if the
second part, i.e. MF , halted on input j. Thus, the same proof that MMF
is a malware, also, serves as a proof that MF halts on input j.
Suppose, on the other hand, that a proof exists in F that MMF is not
a malware, i.e. it does not exhibit malware behaviour when activated. By
the construction of MMF , this can happen only if Mw is never activated
during the operation of MMF . In turn, this can happen only if MF does
not halt on input j. Thus, again, the same proof that MMF is not a
malware, also, serves as a proof that MF does not halt on input j. 
From Theorem 5 we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. To any formal system F , there correspond infinitely many,
effectively constructible, Turing Machines for which there is no proof in
F that they behave as malware and no proof that they do not behave so.
Proof. Observe that in the effective, i.e. algorithmic, construction process
described in Theorem 5, Mn can be any of countably many infinite Turing
Machines that simply avoid the states in QMal and Mw can be any of
countably many infinite Turing Machines that do not visit states in QMal
during their operation. MF stays fixed (it depends only on F). 
Finally, in the same spirit with Corollary 1 for the Turing Machine Mi0
or MF in the notation of Theorem 5, we prove the following about MMF
which, actually, shows that MMF , as well as the infinitely many Turing
Machines built around MMF in Corollary 2, is not a malware but no proof
exists within the formal system F if it is consistent.
Corollary 3. For the Turing Machine MMF it holds that it is not a
malware if and only if F is consistent.
Proof. The proof is, essentially, the same as the proof of Corollary 1, since
MMF contains MF and it is constructed in such a way so that it is not a
malware if and only if MF does not halt on any particular input j. 
5 Discussion and directions for further research
In this paper we addressed the problem of whether it is possible to have a
complete, in principle, classification of all programs either as malware or
non-malware, using suitable formal systems and their proof mechanisms.
Based on Cohen’s pioneering work, we showed that no algorithm exists
that can classify all programs, in general, as malware or non-malware, i.e.
the malware identification problem is undecidable. Further to this result,
we showed that to each formal system, there corresponds a recursively
enumerable, infinite, set of Turing Machines, which depends on the formal
system’s details, for which no proof exists, in the formal system, with
respect to whether they are malware or non-malware.
From Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 it follows that, in principle, there is
an infinity of programs for which a formal classification with respect to
whether they are malware or not is impossible, no matter what formal
system is used for this classification. This implies, that an infinite set
of programs exists, which can be potentially malware, which cannot be
proved to be so in any formal system we may ever devise, no matter
how expressive and powerful is. Moreover, the members of this set are
recursively enumerable, i.e. there exists a systematic way to list them.
This, however, may provide the means to malicious parties to generate
programs whose malware status is undecidable, by purely formal means. It
only suffices to know the details of the formal system deployed to classify
programs as malware and non-malware.
Additionally, as Corollary 3 shows, all these programs are, actually,
non-malware programs, unless the formal system, F , deployed for the clas-
sification task is inconsistent. Thus, although these programs are harm-
less, it is, nevertheless, impossible to classify them as such within any
consistent formal system F . Furthermore, if F is, actually, inconsistent,
it is possible that the Turing Machines constructed in Corollary 2, are
malware programs, in view of Corollaries 1 and 3. Thus, the agonizing
dilemma may be the following: Is the program under scrutiny really, a
non-malware program, as guaranteed by Corollary 3 or is it true that
the formal system deployed to classify the programs, as malware or non-
malware inconsistent, in which case the guarantee of Corollary 3 is not
valid? We should stress the fact the proving that a given formal system
F is consistent is a notoriously difficult problem. There exist examples of
formal systems proposed in the past (e.g. ML, proposed by Quine in [8])
that were, later, proved (perhaps unexpectedly) to be inconsistent (ML
was proved inconsistent by Rosser) as well as formal systems extensively
used today in mathematics, whose consistency status is, still, unknown,
such as Zermelo-Fraenkel’s set theory with the axiom of choice.
As a next step, the status of the Malware Detection Problem can be
pursued under other plausible definitions of malware behaviour either tar-
geting, for instance, the behavior (i.e. sequences of specific computational
steps) or, even, the languages that malicious malware Turing Machines
may accept (this approach is pursued in [7]). We believe that the investi-
gation of the decidability status of any entity recognition problem (such
as malware), can be, considerably, benefitted from a formal definition
of the entities’ characteristic behavior using a computational formalism,
such as Turing Machines. Thus, the rich results of computability and
computational complexity theory can lead to the derivation of interest-
ing findings with respect to the fundamental difficulty of detecting such
entities. Hopefully, our work is one step towards this direction.
We close our paper with the abstract of Ken Thomson’s excellent
Turing Award lecture (see [11]) that summarizes so succinctly our con-
clusions, i.e. that no automated solution can be relied on for a complete
characterization of all programs as malware or non-malware: To what ex-
tent should one trust a statement that a program is free of Trojan horses?
Perhaps it is more important to trust the people who wrote the software.
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